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Operati~n Keelhaul Expos~d

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel
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At 5:00 A.M. on Sunday, the sleepy prisoners of
war were abruptly surprised by the glare from
searchlights mounted on tanks surrounding the com
pouhd. Soldiers barged in, followed by a convoy of
trucks. The prisoners were lined up, searched, and
loaded lying face downward onto the trucks. With
well-armed guards beating any of the prisoners who '
moved, the trucks drove to the railhead where .the.
prisoners were unloaded i.nto waiting cattle cars. The
empty trucks returned and picked up load afte~ load.
When all 3000 prisoners had been stuffed aboard, the
train carted them off for eventual transfer to slave
labor camps or to be executed. The date was
Febru ary 1946. The location was Plattl ing, a town in
Bavaria, Germany. The prisoners were Russian, but
the soldiers were not German. They were Americans
of the 101st Airborne Division who were engaging in
an operation that became commonplace in Europe at
the close of World War II. For the Russian prisoners
were refugees from Stalin's dictatorship, remnants of
the Second KONR Division of Vlasov's anti-Commu
nist army. They were being repatriated, by force, to
the Soviet authorities as part of what was officially
labeled, after one of the most severe forms of torture
ever used aboard sailing ships, OPERATION KEEL
HAULI
Smith Hempstone, in his review of Solzhenitsyn's
The Gulag Archipelago, 1918· 1956, estimates that
"Not one American in 100,000 has heard of 'Opera·
tion Keelhaul' ..." So far as I know, until the
publication of Julius Epstein's volume, information
on ' Operation Keelhaul could only be found in this
country in a few scattered articles from newspapers
and magazines and also in three books: Our Secret
Allies, Eugene Lyons' history of Russian opposition
to Communism; The East C8me West, Peter J .
Huxley-Blythe's account of the Cossacks during the
War; and The Politician, Robert Welch's treatise on
Eisenhower. During the. fervor that accompanied the
Second World War, the United States Government
assumed d ictatorial and awesome powers, even by
today's standards, and that is perhaps why no other
period offers so many undisclosed skeletons in the
closet-scandals covered-up or glossed over. The case
.hffrey Rogert Hummel ~ived 8 B.A. in history from
Grove City Colll!{ltt In 1971. He hM spent the 111ft -1111 yeert
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of Tyler Kent, the Sedition Trials, the provoking of
the Pearl Harbor attack, the concentration camps for
Japanese-Americans, and many others that might be
mentioned; all are events involving raw and brutal
state power or perfidy, and yet the details of none of
them are even today generally known. But of all the
shocking and yet unknown crimes perpetrated by the
:u.s. Government during World War II, Operation
Keelhaul ~undoubtedly the most massive. Its
victims were e tho sands of refugees, both soldiers
....the West from the successful
and civilians
advance of e Red armies through Eastern Europe.
Th$£iwek hoping to escape Communist tycanny and
fi
lum, but instead they were all collected by
the Allied ar111ies and forcibly repatriated into the
anxious arms of the Soviets.

teeing~

OPERATION KEELHAUL By Julius Epstein. Old
Greenwich: The Devin·Adair Co. 1973. 255 pp.

$8.95.
THE LESSER EVIL
· Like the prisoners at Plattling, many of those
forcibly repatriated were Russians who had fought in
German uniforms. When the German armies had first
invaded the Soviet Union, many Russians considered
the event a golden opportunity for overthrowing
Stalin and liberating Russia. Even after Hitler disillu·
sioned them by implementing . Rosenberg's cruel and
insane Ostpolitik, there were still a good number who
felt that German oppression was the lesser of two
evils. Further, many officers of the · Wehrmacht
disagreed with the Ostpolitik, and it wasn't very long
before OKH headquarters was silently tolerating the
employment of Russian deserters and prisoners of
war, first as support troops, where they came to be
known as Hilfsfreiwillige, and later as combat troops,
" who were called Osttruppen.
In 1uly of 1942, the Germans captured- General
Andrei A. Vlasov, a Soviet war hero who had been
awarded the Order of the' Red Banner for his
successful defense of Moscow from the initial German
onslaught. By the time of his capture, Vlasov had
become so disenchanted with the Soviet system that
he proposed to the Gelll)ans that they help him
recruit and lead a Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armis
(ROA), Russian Army of Liberation. VIBSOv's propo
sals did succeed in gaining a few concessions from the
Ostpolitik: the Osttruppen were given official sanc
tion, recruited until they totaled nearly one million
november 1974
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men, and even issued ROA insignia. However, the
ROA was never allowed to organize above the
battalion level and, for the most part, was humiliated
and shoved around by being subordinated and sub
merged within lar.Qer German units. Vlasov was given
no real authority; . instead, he was subjected to
unceasing but mostly unsuccessful attempts to use
him for propaganda purposes and to get him to
glorify Hitler and his racist doctrines. Finally, most of
the ROA units were transferred to the Western Front,
where they never wanted to fight in th.e first place.
By 1944, however, tt\e Germans had become
desperate, and they were prepared to give Vlasov free
rein. A Komitet Osvobozhdenia -Narodov Rossii
(Committee for the Liber~ion of the Peoples of
Russia) was formed, and three KONR divisions
totaling 50,000 troops we e organized. They saw
some action against Stalin's.armies, but unfm-tunately •
not before Germany was in the final stages of colla~
and the situation beyond hope. Vlasov, to save his
men from annihilation, concentrated them toward
Austria in order to surrender to the Americans. ( 11
The position the Allies should have taken toward
Vlasov's men and the ROA generally, the position
demanded by the Geneva Convention, was made clear
by Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew in a note to
the Soviet Attache in Washington just before the
Yalta Conference opened:
In regard to the status of the Soviet nationals
under discussion, I feel I must in all sincerity
rein ind you that they were not captured by
American forces while they were detained in
German prisoners of war camps but were serving
· Germany in German military formations in
German uniforms. ...
We cannot repatriate these people because this
would be a gross violation of the Geneva
Convention. They were captured in German
uniforms, and the Geneva Convention does not
permit us to look behind the uniform....
It appears to the appropriate American authori·
ties who have given most careful consideration
to this situation, that the clear intention of the
Convention is that prisoners of war shall be
treated on the basis of th e uniforms they are
\'Yearing, and ... the containing powers shall not
look behind the uniforms to determine ultimate
questions of ci~izenship or nationality....
There are numerous aliens in the United States
Army, including citizens of enemy countries.
The United States Government has taken the
position that these persons are entitled to the
full protection of the Geneva Convention and
has informed the German Government over a
year ago that all prisoners of war entitled to
repatriation under the convention should be
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returned to the custody of the United States
r.egardless of nationality.... (2]
Whoever these "appropriate American authorities"
were, the historical record shows that other authori·
ties prevailed, while Grew himself was soon eased out
of the State Department by Dean Acheson. The
Second KONR Division, which surrendered to the
Americans at landau in Bavaria, was forcibJy repatri·
ated from Plattling in the manner described .above
after they had been repeatedly assur~ by.Col. Gillis,
camp commandant, that such would not be their fate.
When one of the American officers at Plattling
accused the Russians in the ROA of being collabora
tors, he was answered as follows:
It was pJ e chance that during the war we found
ourselves on territory held by the Germans and
took up arms against the Soviet regime with
German help. We wore German uniforms be
cause we had no others, but our should er
emblems of rank and the badge on our sleeve,
the Russian St.. Andrew CroSS"; are all part of our
country's age-old tradition. Our men are Rus·
sians. We fought for a democratic ideal against
the Communist tyranny now gripping our coun·
try. We are fighting for a political idea and are
not traitors or mercenaries. We had only one
aim. The sacred aim of saving Russia. Had the
Zulus fought against Stalin instead of the Ger·
mans, we would have joined them because only
one thing matters.,... to destroy Stalin and Com·
munism.(3]
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Meanwhile, the First KONR Division had side
stepped into Czechoslovakia, turned on their German
allies, and liberated Prague. T hey had done so in
answer to the pleas which the Czech underground had
addressed to the American forces under General
Patton but which the Americans were unable to
answer because they were being held back on orders
from Eisenhower. Since the Red army was close
behind the KONR troops, however, they quickly
marched off to SchiUsselburg, Austria. Here they
made contact with the American forces, Which
disarmed them and then left them at the mercy of the
advancing Red army, refusing to let the division flee
through American lines. The unit disintegrated as its
members either tried to escape as best they could
with the Soviet commandos hunting them down, or
else committed suicide.
Two of Vlasov's generals, Meandrov and Maltzev,
who had surrendered to the Americans, slit their
wrists when they discovered they were going to be
repatriated. They were rushed to hospitals and given
expert treatment. After thl!y recovered, they were
turned over to the Communists. Vlasov himself was
being ·transferred to an American headquarters by an
American convoy when a Red army detachment
intercepted the convoy and removed Vlasov and his
staff. The fact that the American escort offered no
resistance le nds credence to the charge that the
rendevous was prearranged. One year later, Izvestia
announced that Vlasov a'nd all his major subordinates
had been hanged.
FATE OF THE COSSACKS
The victims of Operation Keelhaul included not
only soldiers wearing German uniforms, but also
civilians, as the fate of the Cossacks illustrates. During
the War; the German high command took a much
more enthusiastic attitude towards enlisting the sup·
port of those U.S.S.R. nationalities that it did not
consider Slavic, and therefore Untermenschen.
Among these were Georgians, T urkomens, Cauca·
• sians, etc., but the primary beneficiaries were the
Cossacks.( 4] Some 250,000 Cossacks joined the
German armies . fighting Stalin, including 80,000
organized into the XV Cavalry Corps. When the
German forces were slowly pushed out of Russia, not
only did the Cossack troops withdraw, but large
numbers from the Cossack nation went with them.
The trek was long and arduous, but at the end of the
war nearly 30,000 Cossacks-families, with many
women, children, and ola men- had put themselves
under the protection of the 11th British Armored
Division near Leinz, Austria. They had been joined by
many old Cossack emigres who. had left Russia during
the Civil Wars from 1917 to 1920 and had since lived
in Yugoslavia or Germany. Most of the troops of the
Cossack Cavalry Corps had already been repatri ·
ated at Judenburg, but the Cossacks at Leinz did not
know this when, on May 28, 1945, the British
ordered all the Cossack officers, military officials, and
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physicians to attend a special conference with higher
British officials. Over 2000 Cossack officers, inclu·
ding the very aged Peter Krasnov, who had led the
White armies allied with the British during the Civil
War but had not been in Russia since, boarded a
convoy of over 75 vehicles escorted by 25 Bren gun
carriers, and thl!n were taken, not as they had been
told to a conference, but to the waiting Soviets at
Judenburg. Even the Communists were surprised to
see among their prisoners General Krasnov and so
many old emigres, and were very pleased at the
unexpected opportunity to take vengeance on their
old enemies. Krasnov and his associates, like Vlasov,
were subsequently hanged.
Back at Leinz, word of the fate of their officers
and of the XV Corps had filtered back to the
remaining Cossacks, who organized a passive resist·
ance in which the soldiers and cadets would link arms
and form a protective chain around t he older men,
womel), and children. That is what they did at dawn
on June 1st, when the camps were surrounded by
British Bren gun carriers and armed troops. At a
signal, the troops advanced into the crowd$ and began
clubbing the Cossacks with rifle butts and batons.
Those who tried to run away were shot in the feet
and legs. The victims were thrown onto a convoy of
waiting trucks, which took them to the nearby
rail road siding. As each cattle-car was filled, it was
bound shut with barbed wire and another car was
loaded. Many tried to commit suicide aiong the banks
of the Drava river. One woman, who was dragged out
. downstream and revived, turned out to be a doctor
who had earlier killed her daughter and mother with
overdoses of morphine rather than let them suffer
repatriation. Her second attempt at suicide suc
ceeded. Isolated British troops, fearing for their lives
in the melee, opened fire. The Bren gun carriers
advanced to compress the crowds, and one woman
threw her bab.Y and then herself under the tracks to
be crushed. Two Cossack men approached a British
officer and addressed him in Russian. As the officer
asked his interpreter for a translation, both men slit
their own throats and ; stumped to the ground,
twitchihg and dying. "Our blood is on you and you r
children," was the.translation of their statement. An
engineer from Novotcherkassk shot his twelve-year·
old son, his one-year·old daughter, his wife, and then
himself. Hundreds killed themselves in various fash·
ions.
All day long the trucks drove between the camps
and the railroad, and load after load was locked into
the train. Toward evening, 60 freigt1·cars full started
their journey to the U.S.S.R. Still more remained in
the camps, b'Ut the British decided to cease efforts for
the day. The follow ing' day the Cossacks received a
respite, but on :June 3rd the·repatriations commenced·
again:" There was a slight change of policy as this time
the British finally decided to segregate those who had
be;en Soviet citizens on September 1, 1939, from the
old emigres and only repatriate the former. By the
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end of the 4th, the entire valley had been cleared of
refugees; the repatri~~tinns were complete.

.. .·

~
EUROPEAN REPATRIATES
Citizens of Eastern European co tries (other than
Russia) coming under Communist subjugation were
also victims of Operation Keelhaul. he anti·Commu
nist Croatfan Utashi, fleeing from Tito's partisans,
were disarmed by the Bri~ish at Bleiburg in Austria
and turned over to the Yugoslav dictator.[5} Several
thousand Hungarians who had fought the advance of
the Soviet armies retreated and surrendered to the
Americans. They were repatriated to Budapest where
many were publicly e~ecuted.[6}
·
As the dust settled on defeated Germany, the
Allied armies started the huge task of herd ing
together all the prisoners of war and refugees and
concentrating them in OP1(Displaced Persons) camps.
Many had in their possession Allied leaflets dropped
from the air which branded as a lie the Nazi charges
that prisoners would be shipped to Russia. Neverthe
less, special repatriation teams of Allied and Soviet
officials went through the camps questioning and
screening in order to sort out all who might have been
residents of the Soviet Un io n or the Eastern Europe·
an countries. Those to be repatriated were sent to
special camps which were policed by British and
American troops under the supervision of Soviet
officials, who insured that any anti-Communist
propaganda or activity was suppressed. In Julyl1945,
the operation of the DP camps was- t.ransferred"from
the G·5 of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force) to UNRRA (United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). Herbert
Lehman and later Fiorella LaGuardia, as heads of
UNRRA, assumed the task of forced repatriation
with the same enthusiasm that they displayed when
using UNRRA funds to finance the solidification of
the Lublin Gang's hold on Poland.
Ghinghis Guirey, an American on one of the
screening teams, reported:

The most· unpleasant aspect of this unp leasant
business was the fear these people displayed.
Involuntarily one began to look over one's
shoulder. I heard so many threa~ to commit
suicide from people who feared repatriation that
it became almost commonplace. And they were
not fooling. [7)
Another observer, a priest, confirmed the attempts at
suicide when the day for repatriation came at the DP
camp at Dachau:
·
·

'

In Oachau, where there were no prisoners of war
but just ordinary d,eportees, Ostarbeiter, Ameri·
cans ordered them handcuffed in order to tuni
them over more conveniently. The unfortuniue
men, driven \ to desperation, smashed window
panes with their heads and cut their throats with
november 1974

glass. They managed somehow to set fire to one
of their barracks and threw themselves into the
flames, having first soaked themselves in spilled
gasoline.- Ten otth men were burned to death.
There were 275 ses of suicide or attempted
suicide. (8)
I

Another report about Oachau was carried in the Stars
and Stri'pes for January 26, 1946:
" It just wasn't human," one guard said. "The
, G.l.'s quickly cut down those who hanged
thef"(lselves from rafters. Those who were still
conscious were screaming in Russian, pointing
first a' the guns of the guards and then at
themselves, begging·to be shot."
"Even when we were try ing to help and send
them to hospitals they refused to live. One had
stabbed himself in the chest and seemed almost
out when we put him on a litter and loaded him
onto a truck. Every time he moved blood
spurted from the wound. Two MP's could not
subdue him. Two of them· broke their billies
hitting him on the head." [9}

wer~

Such horror scenes
the rule in L) ndreds of \
other DP camp's all over Germany,
France,
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In fact, Operation
Keelhaul even reached the 'United States. Many
Russians were brought as prisoners of war to camps
chiefly in ldahd. At the end of the war, they were all
boarded on Soviet ships at Seattle and Portland
except for almost 200 who had put UR. tl)e most
violent resistance and were instead move"d to Fort
Oix, N.J. There, another attempt was made to
repatriate them in w'hich the MP's used, tear-gas. The
three who committed suicide are buried . in the
National ·Cemetery at Salem, N.J. The remainder,
when forced aboard the Soviet vessel, rioted and
dismantled the ship's engines with their bare hands.
The ship could not leave port, ·so the. Russian
prisoners were returned to Fort Oix. Finally, the
American authorities made a third attempt at repatri·
ation by surreptitously mixing barbiturates into the
prisoners' coffee and loading them on a Soviet ship
while they were unconscious. The third attempt
succeeded.
The r.nany Polish officers serving in Italy with Polish
units loyal to the Mikolajczyk government in exile in
England committed suicide when they realized that
they would be repatriated to the authority of Stalin's
Lublin Gang.
In short, the Allied armies tracked down everyone
who could conceivably be construed as a Russian or
Eastern European citizen-men, women,.and children,
soldiers and civilians, · those who had fought with
Germany and th~ who had fought against Germany
-collected them together and brutally handed 'them
over to Stalin and his minions. It is estimated that

1t.:i";,
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between two to five million victirns were in~olvedl
The excuse of tho$e who participated in and executed
o'peration Keelhaul was that they were "acting i;inder
orders," that forced repatriation was required by the
Yalta Agreement. However. 8$ Epstein conclusively
demonstrates, the Yalta Agreements; while calling for
system ()f repatriation;· said absolutely noth ing
about the use of force, and furthermore, Operation
Keelhaul was already in full swing in June 1944, eight
months prior to Yalta.

a

'

WHO WAS TO BLAME?
Welch and Huxley-Blythe, in their previous ac·
counts, have asserted that the ind ividual bearing the
primary responsibility for originating and implement·
ing Operation Keelhaul was the commander of
SHAE F, Genera l Eisenhower. Epstein avoids making
any final assessment of guilt, but much of his
evidence s upports and none of it contradicts those
accusing ·Eisenhower. Whatever Eisenhower's initial
c ulpabi lity, it was certainly compounded by the
distortions of the truth about the affair that he
published in his book, Crusaae in Europe:
These policies and agreementS [Yalta] we first
tried to apply without deviation, but we qu ickly
saw that their_...rigid application wou ld often
violate the fundamental humanitarian principles
we espoused. Thereafter we gave any indiv idual
who objected to · return the benefit of the
doubt. [10]
Incidents at the DP camps in Rimini and Pisa in Italy ·
indicate that Operation Keelhaul W/lS still being
enforced at least as la.te as,1947, long after Eisenhow.
er had moved up from SHAEF to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
·
The reason, of course, that the responsib ility for
Operation Keelhaul remains so obscure is that all the
relevant documents still remain locked up and inac·
cessi.ble. Three volumes of records; entitled "Forcible'
Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens-Operation
Keelhaul," were classified Top Secret by the U.S.
Army on September 18, 1948,.and bear the secret file
number 383.7·14. 1. Other documents are being held
under .wraps in the UNRRA Archives by the U.N.
Seeretariat and in the British Archives by the British
Government. Epstein, who earlier.was instrumental in
uncovering the truth about the Katyn Forest massa
c.re, has been attempting for 20 years, . since 1954, to
get the .veil of secrecy removed from· the Keelhaul
documents. So far, h is efforts, including a suit under
the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, have
proven fru itless:
Consequently, the account in Epstein's book is far
from complete and even slightly disjointed. He has
pieced together reports from partic ipants, eyewit ·
nesses, and 5urviving victims to give a few incidents
and Jhen fitted them into a narrative that brings
forced rep~triation through the policies of the Austri ·
8 reason
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. ~ Italian, and W~ German Governments up to the
incident involving Kodirka, the Lithuanian
seaman;· and relates the entire issue to international
law and the Geneva Convention. He concludes that
forced repatriation, under any circumstances, is a
"crime against humanity, violating international law
and humanitarian principles." [ 1 1) Although a truly
comprehensive account of Operation Keelhaul will
probably have to await the release of the official
documents, Epstein has certainly performed a great
service by publishing a book, the first exclusively
devoted to the subject, that may finally bring
Operation Keelhaul to the attention of the American
public.

·{fi1o

IMPLICATIONS
To libertarians, Operation K!!elhaul is significant
for two reasons. First, it represents an instructive case
study of the fantastic power that even a supposed ly
democratic state can ruthlessly wield during wartime.
Not only were the Allied governments able to
perpetrate the crime, but afterwards, they were able
to impose what Harry Elmer Barnes has appropriately
called an "historical blackout" so effective that it
lasted for nearly '30 years. Secondly, it is a chilling
comment on the motives of those who ran the u:s.
Go~ernment at the time and, by implication, on those
who run it now. It is fashionable, even among
libertarians, to laugh off' e)( planations which ascribe
evi l and deceitfu l (as opposed to well-meaning but
misguided) motives to our political masters in Wash·
ington as "conspiracy theory. " However, no one has
yet produced a satisfactory explanation of · how
Operation Keelhaul resulted from misguided idealism
or liberal b lindness, It seems, at least to me, that any
explanation that falls short of including clandestine
Soviet-American collusion at some level is obviously
inadequate.
Be that as it may, it is interesting in conclusion to
observe that the Soviets do not share the U.S .
Gove rnment's reticence about publicizing Keelhau.l.
When the U.S.S. R. Government released several hun
dred survivors of forced repatriation in 1955-after
10 years in Siberian slave-labor camps-a Russian
newspaper carried the follow ing:
We have let "them" out [referring to the old
Cossack emigres] and we have forgiven "our
own" [referring to the Vlasov soldiers] .
Whether they were Vlasov men or prisoners of
war who did not want to return to the mother·
land does not matter 'now. All their sins have
been forgiven . .
But the English and American bayonets, trun·
cheons, machine guns and tanks used against
them will never be forgotten.
No Russian will ever fo rget Lienz, Dachau ,
november 1974

Plattling, Toronto, and other places of extradi·
tion, including New York. And they must never
be forgotten. It is a lesson all Russians must
learn well. For it shows that you cannot trust
the capitalist st~tes in the future. [12) Iii
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SOtZHMITSYN"S TISJ1Ui~NT
1

John Hospers
George St. George opens his much publicized book
Siberia (David McKay Co., ,1969) with an account of
his childhood in the central Siberian city of Irkutsk
during czarist days. Among other things, he tells how
political prisoners were shipped from European Rus
sia to exile and sometimes imprisonment in Irkutsk,
and he expresses relief that a far more humane regime
has now replaced that of the czars, and that such ·
things no longer take place. When I was in Irkutsk a
few months after read ing this book in 1971, I could
~ traces of czarist days, especially in the architec·
ture, but of cou rse I saw no caravllns of prisoners;
nonetheless, since I had also read other books (such
as Dallin and· Nikolaevsky's Forced Labor ·in Soviet
Russia) I was far from convinced of the trutl'l of St.
George's account.
Solzhenitsyn's book The Gulag Arch'ipelago (the
archipelago being .the "islands" of slave labor camps
scattered across the length of Russia, and "Gulag"
being the acronym for. "Chief Administration of
Corrective Labor Camps") explodes the St. George
myth once and for all. Not that it hadn't already been
exploded by such books as The Great Teffor, a
scholarly and extensively dOOJmented account by
Robert Conquest; bot Solzhenitsyn's work has a
special authenticity: it was written within Russia
Contributing editorJohn Hosptn is a profeswr of ph/liJ«>.
phy •t thtJ Univ.riity of Southern C41ifoml& Author of ITI8ny
bookr. Including Libertarianism, ha is cumtntly tha Libertilrian
Party ctndidattl for gowmor ofCelifomr
· A shorter version
of this nJVitiW i1 being publish«J llimufttl
ily by Books for
Libertarians.
·
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itself, partly from his own experiences (he spent
eleven years in Soviet labor camps, which he survived,
as he says, only because most of the time was spent in
a specia l place of· detention for engineers, such as he
describes in The First Circle, where conditions were
better than in other prisons) but mostly from the
experien~s of others-accounts gleaned from other
prisoners (usually cross·checked .for accuracy) and
some from underground publications and other
GU LAG ARCHIPELAGO. By Alaksandr I. Solzhenit
syn. New York: Harper & Row. 1974. 660 pp.
$12.50/$1.95.
sources which reached him, which he cannot yet
reveal without incriminating the sources.
His account is devastating. People and places and
dates are named; he spares the reader no detail of
horror, until from time to t ime one must lay the
book aside in revulsion that such things actually
occurred. But in addition to the relentless accumula·
tion of factual detai ls, We also learn firsthand what it
feels like to be arrested, interrogated, tortured, sent
oH in the night to destinations unknown. T he impact
is overwhelming; and the upshot of the account is
that conditions in the USSR have been far more
terrible than even in the worst days of the czars.

.If the intellectuals in the plays of Chekhov who
spent all their time guessing what would h11ppen
in twenty, thirty, or fortY'v.ears hjtd been told
that in forty years interrOgnttfn by torture
wou ld be practiced in Russia; that prisoners
would have their skulls squeezed with iron rings;
that a human being" would be lowered into an
acid bi!th; that tl)ey would be trussed up naked
· to be bitten r
nts and bedbugs; that a ramrod
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